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Introduction
We thank Klasios (2014)1 and Stephen et al. (2014)2 for their commentaries on our paper (Bar-
rett et al., 2014)3. Criticisms like these can only help to improve the quality of arguments offered
on both sides. Both Klasios’s and Stephen et al.’s commentaries generate misconceptions, however,
about the aim of our article and our stated position. Before we respond more generally to their
arguments, we want to correct these mistaken impressions.
First, Klasios states that we misinterpret the EP notion of computation. This is simply false. We
do not argue that EP posits a physical architecture. Our characterization of the EP view (p. 3) is that
it “relies heavily on analogies to computational algorithms, functions, inputs, and outputs” and that
its research strategy “involves . . . hypothesizing the kinds of algorithmic “design features” that any
psychological adaptation would require in order to solve such a problem.” The notion of a physi-
cal architecture was raised in response to Robert Kurzban’s implied suggestion that psychological
adaptations are analogous to morphological (i.e., physical) adaptations, and can be reverse engi-
neered in the same way. We disputed Kurzban’s argument precisely because there are no grounds
for positing a particular kind of physical architecture that could serve to support such an analogy
(see also Peters, 2013).
Second, Stephen et al. (2014) present our argument as stating that the primary contribution of
an evolutionary approach to psychology is the idea of massive modularity when, in fact, we stated
merely that the modularity of evolved adaptations is the primary distinction between EP and stan-
dard computational theories. We do not consider modularity to be the primary contribution of an
evolutionary approach to human behavior, as should be clear from our previous work (e.g., Barrett
et al., 2001; Pollet et al., 2009; Stulp and Barrett, 2014), as well as our argument in the original paper.
Both these misconceptions perhaps arise because of a failure to appreciate that we were
addressing the specific question posed for this research topic: is EP the obvious alternative
to standard computational approaches to the mind? Our answer was that one evolutionary
approach to psychology (i.e., the “Santa Barbara School” of Evolutionary Psychology, which
we refer to as EP throughout this piece) was not an alternative approach, nor could it be,
1http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01348/full
2http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01372/full
3http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00867/full
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precisely because it is a computational theory. As such, it could
only be distinguished from other cognitive approaches via the
manner in which it applied evolutionary thinking. A large part
of our paper was then devoted to why we felt the particular
evolutionary approach adopted—namely, modular psychologi-
cal adaptation—fell short. Other evolutionary approaches are not
vulnerable to this criticism, and so we did not include these in our
analysis. Thus, nowhere do we dispute Stephen et al.’s main point
that evolutionary theory is useful for explaining human behav-
ior and that, using Tinbergen’s integrative approach, one can
generate unique predictions (see also Barrett and Stulp, 2013).
The Not-Always-so-Uniquely Predictive
Ability of Evolutionary Theory
We do want to add, however, that evolutionary theory may not
always be as uniquely predictive as Stephen et al.’s examples sug-
gest. With respect to disgust, we read (p. 2): “the principal driver
behind studying this emotion’s relationship with the immune sys-
tem was based upon the idea that disgust functions to aid dis-
ease avoidance (Stevenson et al., 2011)” and that such “avenues
of enquiry would not have been envisaged” without evolution-
ary theorizing. Their confidence in the latter statement is per-
haps misplaced, however, as Stevenson et al.’s (2011) research
drew explicitly on earlier findings by Bosch et al. (2001) that
were obtained without any reference to either disgust or evolu-
tionary theory (as acknowledged by Stevenson et al., p. 900). At
best, then, we might say that, in this case, the functional explana-
tion represents a plausible post-hoc account and further clarifica-
tion of an already established phenomenon, rather than that the
functional perspective made unique predictions that allowed the
phenomenon to be identified in the first place.
Similarly, in their second example, Stephen et al. predict that
species with trichromatic vision (i.e., the ability to distinguish red
from green) will make use of red coloration as cues and signals
more than dichromats. Again, the prediction that animals unable
to see red will not make use of red coloration, whereas those ani-
mals that can see red potentially might do so, is in itself not a
very strong evolutionary prediction, given that one could just as
easily formulate such a prediction solely on an understanding of
extant species’ visual systems. It is, however, important to note
that we are not denying the importance of evolutionary theory.
Our point is simply that we should not overstate its power to
generate unique predictions and empirical findings that would
otherwise not occur. Similarly, most findings in evolutionary psy-
chology are, as the authors of many of these articles themselves
note, consistent with evolutionary predictions, but do not rule
out other potential explanations.
Ultimately Proximate?
Stephen et al.’s second point is that we have confused proximate
and ultimate levels of explanation. Specifically, they state that
“Barrett et al.’s (2014) conception of e-cognition as an alternative
to evolutionary approaches to cognition and behavior mischarac-
terizes e-cognition as an ultimate explanatory framework, when
it should properly be considered proximal” (p. 2). We believe
this criticism is unwarranted for several reasons. First, we raised
E-cognition as an alternative to the standard cognitivist, com-
putational approach to psychology, and not to a functional evo-
lutionary approach. We do not dispute that phylogenetic and
functional levels of explanation can provide additional “explana-
tory value above standard computation models” (p. 3). Our
actual argument was that E-cognition, and cognitive integration
in particular, could fill some of the gaps left open by current
information-processing approaches, and we said nothing to sug-
gest that this should occur to the exclusion of evolutionary the-
ory. Rather, our point was that, to take Stephen et al.’s example,
seeking answers to how and why humans can program things like
iPhones (and obviously conceive of and manufacture them in the
first place) seems crucial to achieving a “fuller understanding of
cognition and behavior” (p. 3) than we currently possess. Stephen
et al. must surely agree that such a full understanding goes well
beyond the phylogenetic and functional levels of explanation, and
our closing plea for explanatory pluralism was made precisely for
this reason. Klasios, while (surprisingly) using this point against
us, actually agrees on this when he states that “[a]t a pragmatic
level, different research programs will simply find it profitable to
have differing explanatory focuses and emphases” (p. 1).
Second, nowhere did we “mischaracterize” E-cognition as an
ultimate framework, in just the same way that no one argues that
information-processing theories represent an ultimate frame-
work. Both are guiding theories that take a particular stance on
the nature of cognitive processes and, in that sense, both can be
seen as more proximate than ultimate. Some E-cognition theories
may stand on their own without referring to evolutionary theory,
in the same way that most information-processing-theories sim-
ilarly lack this explicit connection. That said, Stephen et al. per-
haps jumped the gun by stating that E-cognition is a proximate
and not an ultimate approach, without providing any reason as
to why this is the case. Indeed, some forms of E-cognition are
fundamentally evolutionary. For instance, certain aspects of the
extended mind argument have been made in an explicitly evolu-
tionary way, captured by Clark’s (2005) “007 Principle” and Row-
lands’ (2003) “barking dog principle.” Both of these suggest that
a thrifty evolutionary process will not build internal resources
(especially expensive neural tissue) if the structure of the envi-
ronment itself can be exploited in a way that can bear some
of the cognitive burden. Distributed, extended cognition is thus
the process by which internal resources are replaced or comple-
mented by reliable external structures, with the idea that organ-
isms that pursue this route will achieve higher fitness. This is
supported by analogies from other species (for example, theman-
ner in which the physics of a cricket’s body automatically filters
out extraneous sounds; a process that would otherwise need to
be performed by neural tissue: Barrett, 2011) and so the extended
mind also adopts the phylogenetic perspective for which Stephen
et al. advocate.
Openness to Change Rather than
Constancy as a Constant
Klasios, in contrast, believes that our suggestion for E-cognition
as an alternative to standard computational approaches stems
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from our flawed understanding of computation, and that “there
is nothing within the theoretical approach of evolutionary psy-
chology that in principle denies the existence of . . . ‘E-cognition’”
(p. 1). We disagree strongly with this point, and tackle it in con-
junction with Klasios’s assessment that “our discussion of human
nature is also problematic” (p. 1). The latter assertion seems to
be based on a misreading of Wheeler and Clark (2008) state-
ment that our extended cognitive architecture’s “constancy lies
mainly in its continual openness to change” (p. 3572, emphasis
added). While we take “change” to be the key here, Klasios takes
it to be “constancy,” arguing that EP recognizes “this underlying
constancy and refers to it as our underlying ‘developmental pro-
grams’” (p. 1). Klasios’ apparent misunderstanding of Wheeler
and Clark’s position leads nicely into a consideration the fun-
damental differences between E-cognition and computational
theories.
It is important to note that we completely agree that some
varieties of E-cognition can be seen as complementary to com-
putational theories, given that they raise no objections to a rules-
and-representations approach (as we explicitly addressed in our
paper; p. 10). The EP position on psychological phenomena
as adaptations, however, does not, in fact, gel very well with
E-cognition, since the latter argues for the deep intertwining
of brain, body and environment, whereas EP emphasizes a dis-
junction between these elements. EP’s premise is that cognitive
processes occur in the brain alone, and that our psychology is
adapted to a past (environment) that in large part no longer
exists, hence we are often mismatched to the modern world
(e.g., Tooby and Cosmides, 1990). In this view, our psychological
processes may often operate in opposition to the world around
us, whereas the E-cognition view is that body and environment
should be considered as integral parts of the cognitive system.
We can see this even more clearly in Klasios’s suggestion that EP
deals only with a functional level of explanation that “abstracts
away from instantiations in brain, body and the larger context
in which they are embedded” (p. 1). In addition to the fact that
the concept of an “abstracted adaptation” is entirely unclear to
us, this position is fundamentally at odds with an E-cognition
view which holds that no such abstraction is possible because
cognitive processes are precisely a function of a brain embedded
in a body embedded in an environment, all of which make cru-
cial, often constitutive, contributions to those cognitive processes
(e.g., Clark, 1997).
Klasios goes on to suggest that we misrepresent the EP
view on human nature by neglecting Sperber’s notion of
epidemiological culture (see e.g., Sperber, 1996), which, accord-
ing to Klasios, is equivalent to an E-cognition approach. Sper-
ber’s (1996) argument is, however, focused more strongly on
how existing (evolved) psychological structures influence the
kinds of cultural patterns produced (as captured in his notion
of “cultural attractors”), with less emphasis placed on how
culture actively alters our psychology. This is perhaps to be
expected given that Sperber (1996) adheres to a standard
EP view of psychological adaptations (modules) to past envi-
ronments (also note that epidemiological or transmitted cul-
ture is given far less prominence in Tooby and Cosmides’
conception of culture than Klasios suggests). Sperber’s more
recent position is that cultural phenomena “invade and inflate”
our evolved mental modules, often resulting in “mismatches”
between evolved function and current usage (Sperber and
Hirschfeld, 2004), whereas cognitive integration argues that our
psychology is never fixed but continually transformed as it
incorporates various kinds of cultural artifacts (including the
iPhone).
Conclusion
Again, we would like to thank John Klasios and Ian Stephen
and colleagues for engaging in this discussion and providing
us with the opportunity to clarify our position. We hope our
original paper and this reply continue to spark debate on our
computational nature or lack thereof.
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